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COMMENTS
BLOOD GROUPING TEST RESULTS-A COLLECTION OF
PENNSYLVANIA DECISIONS AND ANALYSIS OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA RULE AS TO PROBATIVE WEIGHT.
In what has been characterized as the first reported decision on blood
grouping tests in the United States,' Commonwealth v. Zammarelli,2 a
criminal prosecution for fornication and bastardy, the court granted a new
trial on the ground that the jury verdict of guilty was against the evidence
in that the results of blood grouping tests excluded the defendant as the
father and the Commonwealth had offered no direct testimony that the
blood grouping was done inaccurately. Conceivably, of course, on retrial,
the jury could once again return a verdict of guilty in the teeth of the same
medical testimony, which would require another trial at which they could
again return a verdict of guilty, necessitating yet another trial ad infinitum.
Twenty-six years, thirteen Pennsylvania appellate court decisions on blood
grouping tests, and one Pennsylvania blood grouping statute later, a Penn-
sylvania trial judge presiding over the same situation at trial faces what
he may well believe to be the same vexing problem. The difficulty now
springs from the well-entrenched Pennsylvania rule that the trial court,
in proceedings to establish paternity, may not direct a verdict for the de-
fendant on the basis of the results of blood grouping tests excluding him
as the father even though the accuracy of the administration of the tests
has gone unchallenged directly, but should the jury find the defendant
guilty, the trial court may order a new trial on the ground that the verdict
is against the evidence.a
1. So characterized by the commentator of an exhaustive collection of American
blood grouping cases in Annot., 163 A.L.R. 939, 940 n.1 (1946) later supplemented by
Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1000 (1956). It suffices for the purposes of this Comment to say that
it is an established scientific fact that non-paternity (though not paternity) may be con-
clusively shown through the results of blood grouping tests. The scientific bases and
procedures of blood grouping, as well as a collection of the leading medicolegal works
in the field, may be found in 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 165a, 165b (1940, Supp. 1957) ;
Notes, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 277 (1951), 34 CORNELL L.Q. 72 (1948) ; two articles by medi-
cal doctors: Glazer, Blood Grouping Tests in the Proof of Non-Paternity, 33 MICH.
S. B. J. 12 (1954), and Denton, Blood Groups and Disputed Parentage, 27 CAN. B. REv.
537 (1949), which was commented upon in a letter by another doctor in 27 CAN. B.
REV. 758 (1949). See also SCHATKIN, DIsPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS (3d ed. 1953)
which seems to be considered the leading work in the field.
2. 17 Pa. D.&C. 229 (Q.S. Fay. 1931).
3. Commonwealth v. Hunscik, 182 Pa. Super. 639, 128 A.2d 169 (1956), discussed
in detail infra. Although the Blood Grouping Act is most commonly applied in prosecu-
tions for fornication and bastardy; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4506 (Supp. 1956), its use
would be just as proper in prosecutions for neglect to support a bastard, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 4732. See note 36 infra.
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In a recent paternity case in the Quarter Sessions Court of Cambria
County, Commonwealth v. Nathantic,4 the defendant was found guilty of
fornication and bastardy despite negative results from blood grouping tests
the accuracy of whose administration had not been directly challenged by
the Commonwealth. The court characterized the trial judge in such situa-
tions as "securely impaled on the horns of a dilemma" in being faced on
the one side with what the court considered to be incontrovertible scientific
fact that the defendant is not the father, and, on the other side, with the
Pennsylvania rule that the issue of paternity must be submitted to the jury.5
It is to be noted that Pennsylvania is not alone in its view that, despite
negative results from blood grouping tests whose administration is unchal-
lenged directly, the issue of paternity must nonetheless be submitted to the
jury.6 The majority view, however, is that the results, under such cir-
cumstances, are "conclusive" on the issue of paternity unless sufficient
evidence is introduced to support a jury finding that the tests were in-
acurrately administered.7
This Comment will be directed to a consideration of those decisions
which have established and are shaping the Pennsylvania position on blood
grouping tests with an analysis of the Pennsylvania Blood Grouping Act
of 1951, and a comparison of the two views presently held as to the weight
to be afforded the results of blood grouping tests in actions to establish
paternity.8
I.
A SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF PENNSYLVANIA BLOOD GROUPING DECISIONS
A.
Prior to the Pennsylvania Blood Grouping Act of 1951.
Commonwealth v. Zammarelli 9 is worthy of note not only as the pro-
genitor of American judicial expression on blood grouping tests, but also for
4. THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER No. 79, p. 1, col. 1 (Cambria County Quarter Ses-
sions Ct. Oct. 5, 1957).
5. See note 3 supra.
6. See Ross v. Marx, 24 N.J. Super. 25, 93 A.2d 597 (1952) ; Prochnow v. Proch-
now, 274 Wis. 491, 80 N.W.2d 278 (1957). See also Williams v. Williams, 230 La. 1,
87 So.2d 707 (1956).
7. Jordan v. Mace, 144 Me. 351, 69 A.2d 670 (1949) ; Anonymous v. Anonymous,
1 App. Div.2d 312, 150 N.Y.S.2d 344 (2d Dep't 1956) ; Clark v. Rysedorph, 281 App.
Div.2d 121, 118 N.Y.S.2d 103 (3d Dep't 1952) ; Commissioner v. Contonie, 277 App.Div.
90, 97 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1st Dep't 1950). See also Pomainville v. Bicknell, 118 Vt. 330,
109 A.2d 342 (1954). THE UNIFORM ACT ON BLOOD TESTS To DETERMINE PATERNITY,
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
the American Bar Association in 1952, proffers the conclusive view and has been adopted
by California, New Hampshire, and Oregon: CALIF. ANN. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1980.1-
1980.7 (1953) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 522:1-522:10 (1953); ORE. REV. STAT. §
109.250-109.262 (1953). Michigan adopted the Uniform Act in 1954, but the following
year abandoned it by amendment and repeal. MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 25.471-25.475 (1955).
Utah enacted provisions which approach those of the Act, but its variations are sub-
stantial. Utah Laws 1955, c. 46. See THE UNIFORM ACT ON BLOOD TEST To DETERMINE
PATERNITY, 9 U.L.A. pp. 102-114.
8. See text at notes 6 and 7 supra.
9. 17 Pa. D.&C. 229 (Q.S. Fay. 1931).
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what many would consider a wisely avant-garde disposition of a difficult and
then novel problem. The court did not hesitate to espouse the scientific
worth of blood grouping tests explained by a pathologist at the trial. At
the same time, the court evinced an awareness of the fact that while the
laws of genetics may make the blood grouping tests infallible in scientific
theory, in practice the human administrators of the tests remain quite
fallible. Therefore, the results of the tests were subject to attack by the
Commonwealth through an investigation of the accuracy of their adminis-
tration. Since this attack was not made and no scientific opinion was
offered in contradition to the testimony of the pathologist, a new trial was
granted on the group that the verdict was against the evidence. The court
noted that the Commonwealth could, at the new trial, offer evidence of its
own blood grouping tests if it desired.
Analysis of the opinion leads to the conclusion that the court felt that
the negative result of the tests placed a burden on the Commonwealth that
it was required to meet by a direct attack upon the administration of the
tests, and that, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix alone would not
be a sufficient basis for a jury verdict of guilty. This is, in effect, the
"conclusive" view of the probative weight to be accorded medical testimony
of negative results of blood grouping tests which did not come into judicial
vogue until several years later.' 0 The court, however, left open the prob-
lem of the right or duty of the judge in the new trial to direct a verdict for
the defendant should the Commonwealth again fail to direct an attack
against the accuracy of the administration of the tests.
More than two years later, in a prosecution for fornication and bastardy
in the Quarter Sessions Court of Luzerne County," "the defendant pre-
sented a petition averring that he had requested the prosecutrix to surrender
a certain amount of her blood and that of the child for the purpose of es-
tablishing the paternity [sic] of the child by means of a blood test and
that the prosecutrix refused to submit to said request." 12 The defendant
prayed that the court compel the prosecutrix to submit to such an exam-
ination. The court observed that although the Pennsylvania rule in civil
cases allowed the court to dismiss the action for personal injuries for re-
fusal of the plaintiff to submit to an examination, in criminal cases the
"plaintiff is the Commonwealth," and to dismiss the prosecution because
of the refusal of the prosecuting witness to submit to an examination
"would probably result in transferring liability for the child's support to
the poor district or some charitable agency." 13 The court felt that such a
result would be "highly improper and unjust." 14 The court was much
influenced both by the right of the individual to remain inviolate as to his
10. See note 7 supra.
11. Commonwealth v. Morris, 22 Pa. D.&C. 111 (Q.S. Luz. 1934).
12. Ibid.
13. Id. at 113.
14. Id. at 113.
[VOL. 3: p. 180
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person, and by a decision of the Supreme Court of South Dakota 15 which
questioned whether there existed unanimity of medical opinion on the sci-
entific validity of blood grouping tests. The court's statement that in order
to ". . . exercise the extraordinary power to make an order such as the
one sought in the present case to compel obedience thereto, authority for
such an act must come from the legislature . *.".." 16 presaged the position
taken shortly thereafter on the question in an opinion handed down by the
Pennsylvania Superior Court.1 7
In Commonwealth v. Visocki,18 the defendant in a nonsupport action
in the County Court of Allegheny County sought to overcome the presump-
tion of his paternity of a child born to his wife after their marriage by in-
troducing the negative results of blood grouping tests to which the mother
had voluntarily submitted herself and the child. The court, apparently
fully convinced of the scientific validity of the blood grouping tests by the
authorities cited by counsel for defendant and the testimony of two phy-
sicians, 19 dismissed the case in view of "the authoritative preponderance of
the evidence for the defendant." 20 Since the court failed to consider the
possibility that the testimony of the mother might be construed as an in-
ferential denial of the accuracy of the administration of the tests or the
veracity of the medical testimony that the results were negative, and, since,
from the opinion, it does not appear that the Commonwealth contended that
the tests were made inaccurately, the decision, along with the Zammarelli
case, may well be characterized as an early Pennsylvania exposition of the
conclusive view of the probative weight to be accorded evidence of negative
blood grouping results. This is especially so in view of the fact that the
tests were held to overcome one of the strongest presumptions in law, that
of the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock.
21
In 1936, the first decision by an appellate court of Pennsylvania deal-
ing with blood grouping tests was handed down in the case of Common-
wealth v. English," an appeal from a conviction for fornication and bas-
tardy. Error was urged on the ground, inter alia, that the trial court had
15. State v. Damm, 62 S.D. 123, 252 N.W. 7 (1933).
16. Commonwealth v. Morris, 22 Pa. D.&C. 111, 113 (Q.S. Luz. 1934).
17. Commonwealth v. English, 123 Pa. Super. 161, 169, 186 Atl. 298, 301 (1936)
discussed infra.
18. 23 Pa. D.&C. 103 (C.C. Allcgheny 1935).
19. The court's faith in the scientific worth of the tests is in interesting contrast to
the opinion expressed in this regard in Commonwealth v. Morris, 22 Pa. D.&C. 111
(Q.S. Luz. 1934) discussed in text at note 11 supra.
20. Commonwealth v. Visocki, 23 Pa. D.&C. 103 (C.C. Allegheny 1935).
21. However, it should be noted that the great force once accorded this presump-
tion has, through the years, been considerably enervated by the courts. See Chief Jus-
tice Cardozo's opinion in Matter of Findlay, '253 N.Y. 7, 170 N.E. 471 (1930);
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 1 App.Div.2d 312, 150 N.Y.S.2d 344 (2d Dep't 1956). In
Pennsylvania the presumption of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock may be rebutted
only by "clear, direct, convincing and unanswerable" evidence of non-access, lack of
sexual intercourse or impotency. Cairgle v. American Radiator Corp., 366 Pa. 249, 256,
77 A.2d 439, 442 (1951).
22. 123 Pa. Super. 161, 186 Atl. 298 (1936).
COMMENTS
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refused defendant's prayer that the mother be ordered to submit herself
and her child to blood grouping tests. The superior court, while reversing
the conviction on other grounds, discussed 23 defendant's motion for a blood
grouping test in language that recalled the opinion of the Quarter Sessions
Court of Luzerne County dealing with the same problem two years be-
fore.24 The court observed that the Pennsylvania rule in personal injury
actions which is to the effect that it is within the discretion of the trial
court to require the person injured to submit to a physical examination or
suffer dismissal of the action or a stay of the proceedings was inapplicable
to criminal proceedings, for, "to refuse to allow a criminal case to proceed
until a recalcitrant witness submits to an examination would deprive the
commonwealth of its right and duty to enforce its criminal laws." 21 The
court went on to note that:
"Until the Legislature finds that blood grouping tests have attained
such scientific standing as to possess probative value as to paternity 2 6
and that the ends of justice require action by it, and the Legislature
acts, the courts have not the power in a criminal case such as this to
compel a prosecutrix or other witness to submit her body 27 for blood
tests." 28
It took fifteen years for the General Assembly to heed this clarion call
for legislative guidance. In the interim, the lower courts, with only the
meager aid provided by the solution of the narrow question posed in the
English case, continued to wrestle with the multifarious legal problems
attending blood grouping tests. Without a statutory imprimatur, the
tests remained subject to challenge in the lower courts on scientific grounds,
necessitating the submission in evidence of medical testimony and authori-
tative medical publications and articles. In Baker v. Weiss,29 an equitable
proceeding in the Common Pleas Court of Dauphin County to perpetuate
testimony on the legitimacy of a child to determine her right and that of
her issue to share eventually in the income and corpus of a trust, the re-
23. Such discussion was characterized as "controlling" in the dictum of a subsequent
superior court decision: Commonwealth v. Zierenburg, 133 Pa. Super. 112, 1 A.2d 918
(1938).
24. Commonwealth v. Morris, 22 Pa. D.&C. 111 (Q.S. Luz. 1954).
25. Commonwealth v. English, 123 Pa. Super. 161, 169, 186 Atl. 298, 301 (1936).
26. A later decision by the same court, in discussing this passage, noted that the
fact that the tests cannot indicate paternity (but only non-paternity), was an important
factor in the decision. Commonwealth v. Krutsick, 151 Pa. Super. 164, 30 A.2d 325,
327 (1943).
27. The court seemed obsessed by an image of the prosecutrix forced, by court
order, to submit to a "minor operation" with the "always present" risk of infection.
Commonwealth v. English, 123 Pa. Super. 101, 186 Atl. 298, 302 (1936). This "minor
operation" aspect was later termed by the same court as the "principal ground relied on
by us in that case." Commonwealth v. Krutsick, 151 Pa. Super. 164, 30 A.2d 325, 326
(1943). Furthermore, in the English case it proved one of the grounds for holding that
the trial judge properly refused to charge the jury that they could take into considera-
tion the refusal of the prosecutrix to submit to the tests.
28. Commonwealth v. English, 123 Pa. Super. 161,169, 186 Atl. 298, 301 (1936).
29. 43 Pa. D.&C. 707 (C.P. Dauph. 1941).
[VOL. 3: p. 180
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sults of blood grouping tests establishing illegitimacy were held admissible
on the basis of evidence that the tests were regarded as accurate and relia-
ble by informed medical circles.30 The court noted that the voluntary
submission of the prosecutrix to the tests distinguished the case from
Commonwealth v. English.
The second Pennsylvania appellate court decision on blood grouping,
Commonwealth v. Krutsick,1 held, on the basis of Commonwealth v.
English, that it was not error for the trial court to refuse to admit in evi-
dence, on the trial of an indictment for fornication and bastardy, a letter
written on behalf of the defendant to the mother of the child requesting her
to submit herself and her child to a blood grouping test, and her refusal
to do so; and that it was not error for the trial court to refuse to permit
a doctor to explain to the jury that parentage can never be proved, but that
in certain cases it can be disproved. The court noted with approval the
observation in Commonwealth v. English that taking the blood from the
mother and child is "a minor operation" 32 entailing a danger of infection,
and reasoned that ". . such a thing done forcibly, against her will, would
be a serious assault and battery." a3 Moreover, the fact that advocates of
the compulsory use of the test would restrict their use to cases where they
showed the impossibility of paternity,34 struck the court as an inequitable
"heads I win, tails you lose" arrangement in favor of the putative father.8 5
30. In Spencer v. Spencer, 47 Pa. D.&C. 192, 194 (C.P. Dauph. 1942), the same
court in a declaratory judgment proceeding to determine the legitimacy of the child
against whose legitimacy the blood tests were submitted in Baker v. Weiss, 43 Pa. D.&C.
707 (C.P. Dauph. 1941), decreed the child to be illegitimate, noting that the blood test
results and other evidence militating against her legitimacy were "wholly uncontra-
dicted." Under the Blood Grouping Act of 1951, discussed in the text immediately
before and following note 36 infra, compulsory blood grouping tests are not available
to parties disputing the claim of a child to share in an estate. See note 36 infra,
31. 151 Pa. Super. 164, 30 A.2d 325 (1943).
32. Id. at 326.
33. Ibid.
34. Since a positive result merely indicates a possibility of paternity, the reasoning
was that such results should be excluded "for lack of any real probative value as com-
pared to its highly prejudicial effect on the accused." Flacks, 21 A.B.A.J. 680, 682
(1935), quoted in footnote 3, at 326. For a recent case that turned on this precise point,
see State v. Morris, 156 Ohio St. 333, 102 N.E.2d 450 (1951), in which a conviction
for bastardy was reversed on the grounds that the positive test results admitted in evi-
dence, while showing a possibility of paternity, were too highly prejudicial to the
accused. This is the ordinary holding.. Pennsylvania subsequently embodied this view
in its Blood Grouping Act of 1951 by specifically forbidding positive results to be ad-
mitted in evidence. (See text immediately before and after note 36 infra.) However, in
an appeal from a conviction for rape before the superior court seven years after the
decision in the Krutsick case, it was held that where the prosecutrix testified that she
bit the finger of her assailant during the struggle in being forced into his car, evidence
that the stains on the seat cover in defendant's auto and on the dress of the prosecutrix
were made by blood of the same type as that of the defendant's was admissable even
though defendant's blood type was common to 45% of all people. Commonwealth v.
Statti, 166 Pa. Super. 577, 739 A.2d 688 (1950). The Uniform Act blazes a lone trail
by providing that "if the experts conclude that the blood tests show the possibility of
the alleged father's paternity, admission of this evidence is within the discretion of the
court, depending upon the infrequency of the blood type. THE UNIFORM ACT ON BLOOD
TESTS TO DETERMINE PATERNITY, 9 U.L.A. § 4.
35. It is to be noted that under the applicable statute, as now, the sentence of con-
viction for fornication and bastardy carried with it the obligation of paying the ex-
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B.
After the Pennsylvania Blood Grouping Act of 1951.
In 1951, the General Assembly enacted a blood grouping statute which,
while neatly disposing of certain problems, quickly gave rise to new ones.
The Act provides that:
"In any proceeding to establish paternity, 36 the court, on motion
of the defendant,3 7 shall order the mother, her child and the defendant
penses incurred at the birth of the child and liability for its maintenance. PA. STA'i.
ANN. tit. 18, § 4506 (Supp. 1956). This lends to the prosecutrix-mother an interest in
the Commonwealth's securing a conviction beyond that of the ordinary prosecuting
witness.
36. A proceeding for a support order was held, in Commonwealth v. Heydt, 3 Pa.
D.&C.2d 129 (P.S. Mont. 1955), not to be a "proceeding to establish paternity" within
the meaning of the Act, thereby precluding defendant from procuring a court order
requiring his wife and putative child to submit to blood grouping tests. Another basis
for the decision Was the court's reluctance to compel the mother to give what could be
evidence of the child's illegitimacy which, since the child was born in wedlock, would
violate what the court felt to be the rule of evidence that neither spouse may, in such
proceedings, give any evidence which would establish the illegitimacy of their putative
child. See note 21 supra. The Heydt case was subsequently cited with approval by the
superior court in affirming the refusal of a lower court to order blood grouping tests in
an action for the support of a minor child born in wedlock. Commonwealth v. O'Brien,
182 Pa. Super. 584, 128 A.2d 164 (1956). A forceful dissent by Woodside, J., was
joined in by Ervin and Carr, JJ. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed by a
4-3 decision, Jones, C.J., Chidsey and B.R. Jones, JJ., dissenting. THE LEGAL INTELLI-
GENCER No. 105, p. 1, col. 3 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Nov. 18, 1957). The Supreme Court, in the
O'Brien case, provided a useful guide for determining in what actions the Blood Group-
ing Act can or cannot be applied:
"At the outset we note that the legislature placed two qualifications upon the
right to compulsory blood grouping tests which substantially limit the scope and
application of the act:
1. Only a male defendant who is the putative father may move to have the
blood grouping tests taken.
2. Such tests are permitted only in 'proceedings to establish paternity.'
These qualifications render the statutory procedure unavailable, among others,
to the following parties who might seek blood grouping tests to negate paternity:
husbands bringing an action for divorce on the ground of adultery, or an action for
annulment because of fraudulent representation as to parenthood; mothers seeking
custody of children; parties seeking a determination that they are the parents of a
child of whom another claims to be the father; parties disputing the claim of a
child to share in an estate; parties attempting to prove noncitizenship of a child;
or to defendants in prosecutions for rape in which the prosecuting witness testified
that as a consequence of the rape she became pregnant and gave birth to a child.
On the other hand, the act does apply to.at least two classes of cases, prosecu-
tions for fornication and bastardy, Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, sec. 506, as
amended, 18 PS § 4506 (Supp.), and actions for neglect to support a bastard, Act
of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, sec. 732, 18 PS § 4732. Thus, apparently the act was
designed to aid the man who is accused by an unwed mother of being the father
of her illegitimate child." (footnotes omitted). Commonwealth v. O'Brien, Ti'.
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER No. 105, p. 10, col. I (Pa. Sup. Ct. Nov. 18, 1957).
37. Since the legislature contemplated the use of the blood grouping evidence at the
trial, a motion made for the tests 38 days after verdict and sentence was held to be too
late in Commonwealth v. Dean, 172 Pa. Super. 415, 94 A.2d 59 (1953). In Common-
wealth v. Davis, 183 Pa. Super. 46, 130 A.2d 216 (1957), an appeal from a prosecution
for fornication and bastardy, defendant, six days before the trial, obtained an order for
blood tests pursuant to the Act, but did not submit the results in evidence because the
pathologist advised his counsel that they did not exclude the defendant as the father.
After conviction, the pathologist admitted that he had arrived *at an erroneous con-
clusion. It was held that denying defendant's expeditious motion for a new trial to
permit use of the corrected report was error.
[VOL. 3: p. 180
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to submit to one or more blood grouping tests by a duly qualified phy-
sician to determine whether or not the defendant can be excluded as
being the father of the child, and the results of such tests may be re-
ceived in evidence but only in cases where definite exclusion of the
defendant is established." 3s
The Act is, in effect, a legislative recognition of the scientific validity
of blood grouping tests. As such, it relieves the defendant of the burden
of establishing their scientific and attendant evidentiary worth, and thereby
shields him from the risk of a judicial conclusion that he has failed to show
sufficient medical acceptance of the blood grouping theory to merit sub-
mission of the results in evidence.8 9 The "minor operation" 40 complex of
the Pennsylvania appellate courts, which arose from their solicitude for the
inviolability of the individual's person, and manifested itself in their refusals
to reverse denials of requests for orders to compel submission of the prose-
cutrix -to the tests, will no longer prove a barrier to defendants in paternity
proceedings. Commonwealth v. English is thus, by legislative fiat, over-
ruled.
Although 'the Blood Grouping Statute clearly swept away the more
serious blood grouping test difficulties which for years had plagued the
lower courts, at the same time it left in its wake-problems of its own. The
Act provides that the results of the blood grouping tests "may be 'received
in evidence." -This would seem an indication of legislative intent that evi-
dence of the test results be treated exactly as other evidence, i.e., that the
weight they are to be afforded is to be decided by the jury, and that the
Act merely precludes attack on the scientific validity of the tests. At first
blush, such analysis seems a fair one and acceptable. Slight reflection, how-
ever, upon its implications conjures up what is, to some, a distasteful pic-
ture. If the jury has the discretion to decide the weight to be accorded the
evidence introduced of negative results, they may well choose to disregard
such evidence, and, relying on the testimony of the mother, bring in a ver-
dict of guilty, even though no direct attack had been made on the accuracy
of the administration of the tests. The Act, in affording no greater weight
to evidence of negative test results than to other admissible evidence, readily
lends itself to such a finding, for the jury, in the performance of its tradi-
tional role of trier of fact, may certainly choose to believe the evidence in-
troduced by the prosecution and disbelieve that introduced by the defense.
Yet, how can the jury choose to disbelieve the evidence of the defense when
that evidence is, by legislative command, to be considered scientifically in-
fallible? To ask the question is to answer it: the jury, while accepting the
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 306 (Supp. 1956).
39. Such risk, prior to the enactment of the Blood Grouping Act, was a very real
one in those courts which entertained doubts as to the scientific validity of the tests.
See Commonwealth v. English, 123 Pa. Super. 161, 186 Atl. 298, 301 (1936) ; Common-
wealth v. Morris, 22 Pa. D.&C. 11 (Q.S. Luz. 1934).
40. See note 27 supra.
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scientific infallibility of the tests, may choose to believe that they were not
administered correctly, or may doubt the credibility of the doctor. Thus,
it is only within the limited area of determining whether the tests were
accurately administered and the results truthfully reported that the Act
allows the jury to exercise its function as fact finder.
Two possibilities now present themselves. The first is the case in
which the Commonwealth introduces evidence that the tests were adminis-
tered incorrectly, or submits in evidence results of its own tests which
contradict the test results introduced in evidence by the defense. Here,
clearly, the jury may reject the defendant's plea of non-paternity, for his
blood grouping evidence has been impeached directly on the only grounds
upon which it is open to attack, to wit, on the question of whether or not
his tests were accurately done, or, if accurately done, whether the results
were truthfully reported. The second possibility, however, presents diffi-
culties. Let us suppose that the defendant's evidence of negative results
from the blood grouping tests are not met by a direct attack by the prosecu-
tion upon the accuracy of their administration or the veracity of the testify-
ing doctor. Is there any basis now for the jury finding paternity? It is
submitted that the only theory upon which the jury may logically find
paternity in such a situation is that (1) they believe the testimony of the
mother establishes the defendant's paternity beyond a reasonable doubt, 41
and, by so believing, are thereby convinced that (2) the tests were inac-
curately done, or the doctor was not telling the truth in saying the results
were negative. In order to establish the guilt of the defendant, then, the
jury must naturally reach proposition (1). It is submitted that it is a
logical impossibility for them to reach proposition (1) without necessarily
having accepted proposition (2). In other words, the jury cannot believe
the mother's testimony in itself divorced from a conviction that it denies
the accurate administration of the tests or the truth of the doctor's testimony
that the results were negative, for it is clear that if the mother's testimony
be true, the tests must have been done inaccurately or the medical testimony
be perjured, and, conversely, if testimony that the tests were done accurate-
ly and that the results were negative is true, the mother's testimony must
be false.
From this analysis, it is clear that the argument may be made that
there need be no direct attack made by the prosecution upon the accuracy
of the administration of the tests or the credibility of the doctor, for the
testimony of the mother inferentially accomplishes either or both of these.
By implication her testimony contradicts the requisite expressed or implied
contention of the defense that the tests were done accurately and the results
were negative. Therefore, even where the prosecution has not alleged the
tests were inaccurately made or that the doctor is not stating the actual
results, the jury is free to be convinced that that defendant's guilt has been
41. This belief may of course be fortified by any testimony of the defendant or
his witnesses which implicates him.
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established by the testimony of the mother and return a verdict of guilty.
Furthermore, since the probative weight of the testimony of the doctor that
the test results were negative is no greater under the wording of the Act
than, let us say, testimony by the very same doctor that the defendant was
with him in South America during the alleged period of conception, a force-
ful argument could be made that the court may not direct a verdict for the
defendant on the basis of the doctor's directly uncontradicted testimony
alone, since the evidence for the prosecution (i.e., the testimony of the
mother ordinarily) could well support a conviction as a matter of law. 42
To go a step further, it might also be said that it would even be improper
to grant a new trial in such situations since the verdict could not be said
to be against the evidence or the weight of the evidence, the evidence of the
test results having no greater probative weight than the testimony of the
mother under the Act.4 3
Nonetheless, it seems that a conviction based on a finding of paternity
by a jury in the teeth of evidence of negative blood grouping results whose
accuracy of administration has gone unchallenged directly, would engender
in most a strong feeling that justice had not been done, notwithstanding
explanations that the Act, on its face, allows the evidence of the test results
to be disbelieved as easily as the South American alibi referred to above.
It is submitted that this visceral reaction is often misguided since it is
based on a deep though understandable awe for the immutable laws of
genetics divorced from a practical consideration of the fallibility of labora-
tory technicians. In the final analysis, the question becomes one of deter-
mining the weight to be given the testimony of a paid medical witness who
states that the tests were done accurately and that the results were negative
vis a vis the flatly contradictory testimony of the hardly disinterested 44
mother-prosecutrix, and vice versa. The scientific infallibility of the tests,
being thoroughly established, no longer enters into a consideration of the
problem. It is now merely a question of the credibility of witnesses. It may
well be that by statute the jury must believe the tests are scientifically valid.
That is not to say they may not at the same time believe the testifying doc-
tor is mistaken.45 That is not to say they may not at the same time believe
the testifying doctor is a liar.
42. Of course, this would only be true where the testimony of the prosecutrix-
mother is in itself satisfactory. In those cases in which it is, the above reasoning would
seem a logical legal rationale for interpreting the Blood Grouping Act as non-conclu-
sive. Commonwealth v. Hunscik, 182 Pa. Super. 639, 128 A.2d 169 (1956), which
interpreted the Act as non-conclusive, is discussed infra.
43. This position is less forceful in view of the very wide discretion given the trial
judge in Pennsylvania to grant a new trial. See note 60 infra. The subject of judicial
power to direct verdicts and grant new trials is dealt with more fully in the text at
notes 57-59 infra.
44. See note 35 supra.
45. The possibility of the doctor making a mistake in the testing and thereby ar-
riving at the wrong conclusion, while always present, may be great if he is not quite
familiar with the requisite procedure and technique. A graphic illustration is afforded
in the case of Commonwealth v. Davis, 183 Pa. Super. 46, 130 A.2d 216 (1957), dis-
cussed in note 37 supra, in which a new trial was granted defendant when the patholo-
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A number of states have adopted the position that negative blood
grouping results are conclusive of non-paternity unless the prosecution in-
troduces sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that the tests were
not accurately done.46 It is submitted that this is, in effect, the creation of
a statutory presumption of the truth of the testimony of the doctor who
conducted the tests that the tests were accurately performed and the results
were negative. It is not clear why the testimony of the doctor should be
afforded such great weight above and beyond that of other witnesses.
There would seem to be one justification for such a presumption in favor
of the doctor's testimony: the ease with which the prosecution may impeach
such testimony, if it be false, by running its own tests. It may well be
argued that the Commonwealth should be forced to resort to this facile
method of checking the medical testimony of the defense. However, the
decisions embracing the conclusive view, as well as those urging its adop-
tion, often attempt to justify their position in language which, while pane-
gyrizing scientific progress, totally ignores human fallibility and thereby
cleanly misses the point.47  The conclusive view must stand or fall on an
evidentiary justification for affording the medical testimony a presumption
of truth, not on extensive quotations from medical journals demonstrating
the scientific validity of blood grouping which no one any longer disputes.
This conclusive view of the probative weight to be afforded medical
testimony of negative blood grouping results in paternity proceedings is
not followed in Pennsylvania. In Commonwealth v. Hunscik,48 an appeal
from a conviction for fornication and bastardy, the prosecutrix testified
that the defendant had intercourse with her on several occasions, the last
of which was the date of conception. The defendant, who did not testify,
called to the stand a pathologist who had made blood grouping tests which
excluded the defendant as the father of the child. Defendant's request for
a directed verdict was refused and the jury returned a verdict of guilty.
Motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial were also overruled.
The superior court, while awarding a new trial on other grounds, stated
that :
gist who had performed the tests and had originally reported positive results, admitted,
after defendant's conviction, that he had come to an erroneous conclusion. For a dis-
cussion of the numerous areas in which error may be made in the administration of the
tests, see U.S. v. Shaughnessy, 115 F. Supp. 302, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Appropriate at
this point are the observations made by the California court in the case of Berry v.
Chaplin, 74 Cal.App.2d 652, 169 P.2d 442, 451 (1946), in which the jury found paternity
in the face of medical testimony that blood grouping tests excluded the defendant as
the father: "When scientific testimony and evidence as to facts conflict, the jury or the
trial court must determine the relative weight of the evidence. Icitations omitted] The
law makes no distinction between expert evidence and that of any other character.
rcitations omitted]" California has since enacted The Uniform Act on Blood Tests to
Determine Paternity. See note 7 supra.
46. See note 7 supra.
47. Jordan v. Mace, 144 Me. 351, 69 A.2d 670, 672 (1949) ; Clark v. Rysedorph,
281 App.Div. 121, 118 N.Y.S.2d 103, 105-106 (3d Dep't 1952) ; Anonymous v. Anony-
mous, 1 App.Div.2d 312, 150 N.Y.S.2d 344, 349 (2d Dep't 1956) ; Cuneo v. Cuneo, 198
Misc. 240, 245, 96 N.Y.S.2d 899, 906 (1950).
48. 182 Pa. Super. 639, 128 A.2d 169 (1956).
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"The Act of 1951 does not accord to blood grouping tests the
conclusive effect for which appellant contends. The statute merely
provides that such tests 'may be received in evidence'. 49  It is there-
fore entirely clear that the trial judge in the case at bar cannot be
charged with error in refusing to give binding instructions, and that
the motion of the court en banc in overruling the motion in arrest of
judgment must be affirmed." "
This decision, in definitively establishing the Pennsylvania position on
what probative weight is to be afforded evidence introduced of blood group-
ing tests, at the same time focuses attention on questions that a rejection
of the conclusive view immediately engenders. Since the Pennsylvania
non-conclusive view -precludes the trial judge from directing a verdict for
defendant merely because the prosecution has failed to introduce evidence
that the tests were inaccurately done, may not a directed verdict be none-
theless granted on the standard basis that the evidence, as a matter of law,
could not support a conviction? It would appear that the power and duty
of the court to decide that a reasonable mind could not, on the basis of the
evidence introduced by the prosecution, find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, should have been left unscathed by the ruling of the Hunscik case.
Hunscik forbids a verdict to be directed merely because the testimony of
the doctor has gone unimpeached directly, whereas the traditional exercise
of the power to direct a verdict would be focused, not on the evidence in-
troduced by the defense, but rather on that of the prosecution-to be spe-
cific, that of the prosecutrix-which might be patently unsatisfactory.5 1 It
49. It is submitted that the phrase "may be received in evidence" allows the jury
to function as fact finder within the narrow area of determining whether the tests were
done correctly and the results were as reported, but does not mean they may also deter-
mine what weight is to be given the tests when they are convinced that they were ad-
ministered correctly and the results were negative. The latter position would imply that
the legislature has compelled evidence of doubtful scientific validity to be received in
evidence, which is certainly inconceivable.50. Commonwealth v. Hunscik, 182 Pa. Super. 639, 643, 128 A.2d 169, 171 (1956).
A new trial was granted, however, since the testimony of the prosecutrix was so un-
satisfactory that the court apparently felt the verdict was against the evidence. In
Commonwealth v. Wright, 383 Pa. 532, 119 A.2d 492 (1956), a case decided before, and
whose facts are similar to, Hunscik, the defendant was convicted of fornication and
bastardy on the testimony of the prosecutrix-mother, despite the introduction of nega-
tive blood grouping results. A new trial was granted "in the interest of justice." De-
fendant, however, appealed first to the superior court, which affirmed, Commonwealth
v. Wright, 178 Pa. Super. 181, 113 A.2d 724 (1955), then to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, contending that the blood tests were conclusive and that he should there-
fore be discharged. Although the case was disposed of by the supreme court on a, pro-
cedural point, the court, in discussing the Pennsylvania statutory motion in arrest of
judgment (one of the functions of which is to provide what might be characterized as
a post-verdict directed verdict: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 871 (Supp. 1956)), noted that
"[The Commonwealth's evidence] amply sustained the charge, and the court was with-
out power to discharge defendant." Commonwealth v. Wright, 383 Pa. 532, 536, 119
A.2d 492, 494 (1956). This sentence could certainly be said to have augured the non-
conclusive position Pennsylvania subsequently took in the Hunscik case.
51. A cdkse which provides a good, albeit extreme, illustration of testimony by the
prosecutrix-mother which is so unsatisfactory as to warrant a directed verdict of ac-
quittal is Commonwealth v. Rex, 147 Pa. Super. 121, 24 A.2d 98 (1942). There, the
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would certainly seem that in a situation where the testimony of the prose-
cutrix is of such a nature, in its content and/or the manner in which it
was given, so as to raise serious doubts as to its veracity, the court might
well find that a reasonable man could not find paternity beyond a reason-
able doubt, and in directing a verdict of acquittal, do no violence to Hunscik.
Therefore, it should be certain that the Hunscik case will be in no way in-
terpreted by the Pennsylvania appellate courts to mean that in a proceeding
to establish paternity where the defendant has introduced evidence of ex-
clusion through blood grouping, the judge may not under any circumstances,
direct a verdict of acquittal. If ever such an interpretation were given the
Blood Grouping Act of 1951, that enactment could, in some respects, prove,
to defendants, to be more of a curse than a blessing.
Another, and more pressing, problem wrought by Hunscik is embodied
in a recent opinion from the Quarter Sessions Court of Cambria County
handed down in the case of Commonwealth v. Nathanic.52 In that case, a
prosecution for fornication and bastardy, the defendant introduced evidence
of blood grouping tests which excluded him as the father. The pathologist,
under whose supervision the tests were run, testified that the test results
were checked three times and that error was "impossible." There is noth-
ing in the opinion which would intimate that either the testimony of the
doctor or of the prosecutrix-mother was unsatisfactory in any way. It
would seem to be a clear case for an exercise of the traditional jury function
of deciding which of two witnesses whose testimony is mutually exclusive,
is telling the truth. Presumably, the jury believed the prosecutrix, for it
brought in a verdict of guilty. The defendant made a motion for a new
trial on the grounds that the verdict was against the evidence and the
weight of the evidence. The court granted a new trial, and discussed what,
in its opinion, it considered to be the post-Hunscik dilemma of the trial
judge in such cases:
"In view of the universal acceptance of blood tests as a 'biological
fact' based on the law of genetics, it would seem the court should, if
satisfied of the accuracy of the tests, direct a verdict for defendant on
a bastardy issue. Thus, in effect, such evidence would be. conclusive
of nonpaternity. However, the Act of 1951 relates only to the admissi-
bility of the evidence and not to its conclusiveness. This was recog-
nized in Commonwealth v. Hunscik, 182 Pa. Superior Ct. 639, where
the court categorically stated that blood grouping tests are not con-
clusive. Thus, a trial judge finds himself securely impaled on the
prosecutrix, a 16-year old girl of obviously limited mental capacity, testified to several
relations with five different men during the summer preceding the alleged date (Sep-
tember 1) of intercourse with defendant, and also testified to relations with another man
within one week of that date. Her testimony in general was contradictory and incon-
sistent. The superior court held that a directed verdict would have been proper in the
trial court on the bastardy issue.
52. THx LEGAL INThELLIGENCER No. 79, p. 1, col. I (Cambria County Quarter Ses-
sions Ct. Oct. 5, 1957).
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horns of a dilemma. On the one side he is faced with an immutable
scientific fact that defendant is not the father of the child, and on the
other side, he must submit the issue to the jury in view of the wording
of the Act of 1951 and the Hunscik decision." 53
It is, of course, difficult to surmise to what extent this decision from the
Quarter Sessions Court of Cambria County reflects trial level judicial
opinion elsewhere in Pennsylvania as to the desirability of the conclusive
view. Should this decision prove, however, the precursor of a trial court
clamor for an amendment to the Blood Grouping Act, it is to be hoped
that a more satisfactory rationale for the adoption of the conclusive view
will, in the future be conceived. It is submitted that this opinion falls
squarely into an error made persistently by the advocates of the conclusive
view. It is not true, as the court says, that the trial court judge is con-
fronted with a dilemma because "on the one side he is faced with an im-
mutable scientific fact that defendant is not the father of the child, and on
the other side, he must submit the issue to the jury .... " Such a state-
ment implies that the doctor's mere testimony that he performed the tests
correctly and that the results were negative, if undisputed, can be equated
with "an immutable scientific fact that the defendant is not the father of
the child." However, as pointed out above, the doctor, in good faith, may
have made a mistake, or he may simply be lying. Nor is it an answer to
say that the court would only direct verdicts in such cases where it was
satisfied of the accuracy of the tests. Jury trials will have little significance
if a court can so take unto itself the resolution of questions of fact. Be-
sides, such a position seems to disregard the function of the motion for a
directed verdict, which is merely to require the court to ascertain whether
or not sufficient evidence has been introduced by the prosecution to support
every material allegation of the indictment, not to weigh evidence and de-
termine credibility.54
After discussing the professional competence of the pathologist who
supervised the tests and noting the precautions taken to prevent error, the
court went on to say that:
"There is not one scintilla of evidence in contradiction, either of
the infallibility of the results, or the accuracy of the testing procedure.
Thus, the jury had for its consideration on the issue, uncontradicted
testimony from a reputable source, not improbable or inherently in-
credible. If such testimony is reviewed dispassionately and justly as
the jury was bound to do, it could lead to no other conclusion than
reasonable doubt of guilt. In view of the verdict, we must conclude
that the testimony was either rejected, or inadvertently overlooked, .by
the jury." 55
53. Id. at p. 8, col. 2.
54. See notes 57, 58 infra.
55. THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER No. 79, p. 1, 8, col. 3 (Camnbria County Quarter
Sessions Ct. Oct. 5, 1957).
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It is difficult to see how it can be said that "there is not one scintilla of
evidence in contradiction" to the doctor's testimony when the prosecutrix
flatly testified that the defendant was the father of her child. Furthermore,
from the facts of the case as reported, there is no reason not to presume that
the testimony of the prosecutrix was also "from a reputable source, not
improbable or inherently incredible," and if "reviewed dispassionately and
justly as the jury was bound to do" could just as well lead to a conviction
of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
In considering the motion for a new trial, the court states:
"[T]o permit a jury merely on the basis of countervailing testi-
mony as to the facts of intercourse by the mother of the child, to return
a verdict of guilty, thereby flagrantly disregarding the results of blood
tests which are accepted by medical science and many courts as a fact
of life and nature founded on an immutable law of genetics, would
cause a great miscarriage of justice against which, under the present
state of statutory and case law in Pennsylvania, the court can only
relieve by granting a new trial." 5
This paragraph provides a patent example of what was noted earlier as
the regrettable tendency of the exponents of the conclusive view to confuse
the infallibility of scientific laws with the long demonstrated fallibility of
human witnesses.
It may be well at this point to consider the grounds for directing a
verdict and granting a motion for a new trial in the light of the subject
under discussion. The usual rule would seem to be that when the evidence
of the prosecution, taken by itself, if believable by a reasonable mind, could
lead to a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court
should not direct a verdict of acquittal.57 Therefore, the court in prosecu-
tions for fornication and bastardy, when considering a motion for a directed
verdict of acquittal, should examine closely the evidence of the prosecution
(usually no more than the testimony of the prosecutrix-mother) to ascer-
tain whether it contains the requisite elements to meet the definition of the
statutory crime. If it does so, the court is powerless to direct a verdict,
and the case should go to the jury to determine the credibility of the wit-
nesses and the weight to be afforded their testimony. This is the ordinary
procedure followed in criminal prosecutions,58 and, as noted above, no com-
pelling reason has been forthcoming from judicial opinions championing
the conclusive view why it should be departed from in fornication and
bastardy proceedings. To go a step further, it could even well be asked
whether the action of the court in the Nathanic case in granting a new trial
56. Ibid.
57. Paul v. United States, 79 F.2d 561 (3d Cir. 1935) ; United States v. Nystrom,
115 F. Supp. 500 (W.D.Pa. 1953); Pauli v. Commonwealth, 89 Pa. 432 (1879); Com-
monwealth v. Beati, 86 Pa. Super. 567 (1926).
58. France v. United States, 164 U.S. 681 (1896) ; Higgins v. United States, 185
Fed. 710 (6th Cir. 1911) ; Commonwealth v. Rex, 147 Pa. Super. 121, 24 A.2d 98
(1942) ; Commonwealth v. Byers, 45 Pa. Super. 37 (1910).
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was proper. It is interesting to observe that a trial judge in Pennsylvania
who is convinced that the conclusive view is a desirable one, may effectively
emasculate the Pennsylvania rule forbidding its exercise. This may be
accomplished by the simple expedient of granting a motion for a new trial
and continuing to do so until the Commonwealth enters a nol pros, a jury is
found which will bring in a verdict of not guilty, or the prosecution success-
fully establishes error in the administration of the tests, disqualifies or
impeaches the doctor, or introduces contradictory results of its own tests.
These latter steps, it should be observed, are the crux of the conclusive
view: to force the prosecution to introduce such evidence as would support
a jury finding that the tests were done inaccurately. In this manner, the
courts may quite easily effect an adoption of what, in fact, amounts to a
conclusive view at the trial level, while at the same time remaining well
within the prohibition of the Hunscik case. Since the Commonwealth may
not apeal the granting of a motion for a new trial in a criminal prosecu-
tion,; 9 this paradoxical situation could well materialize. Nathanic, at any
rate, is the harbinger.
For those who are of the opinion that a jury finding of paternity in the
face of directly uncontradicted medical testimony excluding the defendant
as the father presents a problem which demands a solution, the obvious
remedy is, of course, amendment to the Pennsylvania Blood Grouping Act
to provide that negative blood grouping results will be conclusive unless
such evidence is introduced by the opposing party to support a jury find-
ing that the tests were inaccurately done, or that the results were not as
testified. As noted before, such legislative action, which would amount to
a strong hint to the Commonwealth to run its own tests, can be justified
on the grounds that it would impose a very small burden on the prosecution
and would afford an added measure of certainty to verdicts based on blood
grouping test results. A second solution, less direct and hardly worthy of
recommendation, though its practicability has already been demonstrated
in the Nathanic case, is, as outlined above, for the trial courts to vitiate the
Pennsylvania non-conclusive rule by adamantly granting motions for new
trials until the prosecution meets the burden of the conclusive rule. Unless
an appellate court rules that refusing to grant a motion for a new trial in
such situations is proper (which seems unlikely in view of the type of
broad discretion afforded the trial court in Pennsylvania to grant new
trials) 60 such a procedural stratagem in opposition to the non-conclusive
rule, though circuitous, could prove quite effective.
59. Commonwealth v. Pflaum, 48 Pa. Super. 370 (1911). See Commonwealth v.
Supansic, 93 Pa. Super. 111 (1927). See also discussion on the right of the Common-
wealth to appeal an order granting a new trial in von Moschizker and Garland, The
Right of the Commonwealth to Appeal in Criminal Cases, 3 VILL. L. REv. 36, 41 (1956).
It should also be noted that, theoretically, at least, there is no limit on the number of
new trials the trial court may grant. See Hess v. Stiner, 144 Pa. Super. 249, 250-251,
19 A.2d 560-561 (1941), in which the Pennsylvania rule on this point in civil, as well
as criminal, cases is enunciated.
60. Justice (later Chief Justice) Moschizker in Maloy v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 Pa.
466, 103 A. 882, 883 (1918), stated that "[A] grave responsibility rests upon the trial
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II.
CONCLUSION
The interpretation of the Pennsylvania Blood Grouping Statute of
1951 by the superior court in the Hunscik case places Pennsylvania in the
ranks of those jurisdictions embracing the non-conclusive view of evidence
of negative blood grouping test results.0 1 Although plausible arguments
for the conclusive view may be made, they have only rarely been forth-
coming from its advocates primarily because of a failure to focus attention
on the real issue involved: that of the desirability of affording medical testi-
mony of negative results a presumption of veracity. The whole conclusive-
non-conclusive controversy, however, may well become moot in Pennsyl-
vania should the trial courts choose to avoid the command of the Hunscik
case by resorting to the expediency of granting new trials whenever a
verdict of guilty is brought in in bastardy prosecutions in which negative
blood grouping results have been submitted in evidence without a direct
attack. A more direct and certainly more desirable solution for those ad-
vocating the conclusive view would lie in amendment to the Act. In any
event, should the courts in Pennsylvania decide to champion the conclusive
view, they should strive, in their efforts, to keep clear the distinction be-
tween a legal and evidentiary justification for the conclusive view, and the
scientific laws which underlie it.
Leo Kearney O'Drudy, Jr.
CORPORATIONS-THE INCORPORATED PARTNERSHIP
AND THE PROBLEM OF THE DEADLOCKED BOARD.
The last decades have seen the mushrooming of countless close cor-
porations. When a small group of men or an already existing small partner-
ship desires to incorporate, and they present themselves to an attorney, he
must prepare a place for them within the applicable corporation statute's
framework. Such a group will usually demand a directorate in which
each of them is seated. If they are an even number, a serious problem
arises as to how to cope with the possibility of a voting deadlock of the
even-numbered board of directors.
Many times the more suitable business form would be a general
partnership or one of the statutory variations of the partnership which are
judge to see to it that no verdict contrary to the weight of the evidence or shocking
to the judicial conscience is allowed to stand, no matter how many new trials must be
granted to effect the ends of justice. . . ." (emphasis added). See Hess v. Stiner, 144
Pa. Super. 249, 250, 19 A.2d 560, 560-561 (1941), where the court in stating the Penn-
sylvania position on granting new trials in civil and criminal cases, quoted the above
language of Chief Justice von Moschizker with approval and noted that a new trial
should be granted where, in the opinion of the trial court, the verdict is ". . . against
the evidence or the weight of the evidence, or where the interests of justice require
it.. !" (emphasis added).
61. See note 6 supra.
[VOL. 3: p. 196
17
Editors: Comments
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1958
JANUARY 1958]
available.' However, the attorney, when advising that the partnership
form is more flexible and can provide many of the same advantages to be
found in the corporate form (e.g. limited liability), is faced with two rather
fixed ideas of his clients. One idea is "we will not have arrived in the world
of business until we are incorporated." The other is a "we are all friends
here" frame of mind which is hostile to consideration of the possibility
of a future falling out which, in corporate form, could result in a dead-
locked board. The danger to be avoided is the suicide of dissolution, which,
unless alternatives provided for on organization, will be the only possible
course when the board reaches such an impasse.
The corporate form presents this problem to the small even-numbered
board of directors because of a policy on the part of the courts that the
corporate rights and privileges are a grant from the state which must be
accepted as offered and this means adherence to the statutory scheme.2
The essence of this scheme is management centralized in the board of direc-
tors. The board is to be the supreme authority in matters of management
of the business affairs of the corporation 3 and the stockholders may not
create a powerless or "sterilized" board of directors.4  Into this scheme
the attorney must blend an enterprise which the parties contemplate man-
aging as a partnership.'
The ideal solution would be the recognition of the incorporated part-
nership entity as a separate concept as has been done in the case of banks
and public utilities.6 While steps have been taken in some areas of the
law, 7 the attorney is still confronted with the deadlocked-board problem.
The purpose of this Comment is to suggest some methods which may be
used to avoid this problem and still operate within the present statutory
schemes.
I.
OFFICE OF DIRECTOR.
There are two possible levels of approach to the problem. One is by
directly dealing with the office of director itself. This writer does not
1. See 2 VILL. L. REV. 385 (1956) for some of the variations possible in Penn-
sylvania.
2. Sterling Industries v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., 298 N.Y. 483, 84 N.E.2d 790
(1949); Long Park v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77
N.E.2d 633 (1948); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 42 (1946).
3. See Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Cor-
poration Act, 34 N.C.L. REV. 433 (1955-56), where general corporation law is ably
discussed in the introductory remarks.
4. Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918).
5. Israels, The Close Corporation And The Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488 (1947-48).
6. See Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 18 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 435 (1953).
7. See Israels, The Close Corporation And The Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488
(1947-48) discussing the 1948 amendments to the Stock Corporation Law in New York
and their effect on the close corporation. The pertinent statute is N.Y. STOCK CORP.
LAW § 9.
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believe, with one possible exception stated, that any solution is to be found
at the directorate level because of the terms of the various statutes and the
courts' interpretation of them. In the problem proposed we would have
identity of shareholders and directors but the courts draw a clear line of
demarcation between the two. The directors are charged with the man-
agement of the affairs of the corporation and cannot be controlled in the
reasonable exercise of this duty but are required to depend solely on their
own knowledge of the business and what its interests require.8 For this
reason any scheme contemplating the use of arbitrators to reach a solution
binding on the directors is ineffective." Many corporate statutes permit
the formation of an executive committee composed of members of the
board "I which is empowered to perform acts requiring the highest discre-
tion and judgment," but the same judicial principle, that the board is to
govern, would strike down any arrangement based on the formation, in
order to break a deadlock, of an executive committee of an uneven number
of an even-numbered board.1
2
An exception to this proposition might be found in the California cor-
porate code.' 3  The statute provides that if a corporation has an even
number of directors and they are equally divided on a voting issue, the
court may appoint a provisional director who is to have all the rights and
powers of a director until either the deadlock is broken or until the court
removes him, or a majority of the voting shares votes for his removal.
The purpose of this section, as stated in the statute, is to prevent property
and business loss because of the inability of the corporation to function dur-
ing the deadlock. The writer was unable to find any cases construing this
statute but it seems unambiguous. When a provisional director is appointed
and he casts a vote either negatively or affirmatively, a legally effective
decision is made. Of course, if he votes negatively, i.e., not to adopt the
particular corporate policy, since a solution is had, he automatically loses
his position and the problem of whether or not to adopt the policy may
recurr at the next directors' meeting. This same criticism can be leveled
at other solutions suggested below, but one element in rebuttal is that since,
8. West v. Camden, 135 U.S. 507 (1890) ; Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 322,
119 N.E. 559, 562 (1918); Delaney, The Corporate Director: Can His Hands Be
Tied In Advance, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 52 (1950).
9. In re Allied Fruit & Extract Co., 243 App. Div. 52, 276 N.Y. Supp. (1st
Dep't 1934) ; Hornstein, Stockholders Agreements in the Closely Held Corporation,
59 YALE L.J. 1040, 1051 (1949-50).
10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (Supp. 1956) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:7-4(Supp. 1956); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §2852-402(6) (Supp. 1956). New York
seems to find validity for the appointment of an executive committee of the board in
the board's general power to appoint officers and agents. Ford v. Magee, 160 F.2d
457, 460 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Sheridan Electric Co. v. Chatham Nat'l Bank, 127 N.Y. 517,
28 N.E. 467 (1891).
11. 2 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 495 (1952).
12. Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 260 P.2d 823,
832-33 (1953); Commercial Wood Co. v. Northhampton Portland Cement Co.,
190 N.Y. 1, 82 N.E. 730 (1907).
13. CAL. CORP. CODE § 819 (1947).
[VOL. 3: p. 196
19
Editors: Comments
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1958
JANUARY 1958]
in those solutions, the directors will be elected for a full term, a great many
corporate policies and financial commitments will have occurred before the
even-numbered board will have another opportunity to be faced with the
problem. This postponement can be a very effective solution.
II.
OFFICE OF STOCKHOLDER-STOCKHOLDERS' AGREEMENTS.
The other level of approach is by way of agreements among the stock-
holders. It is here that the most successful manipulations are going to be
made. When there are, for example, four directors, and they.divide evenly
on a major question, the only way the problem is going to be solved is by
one party changing sides or by the appointment of a tie-breaking director.
Since the former solution cannot be relied on, the latter should be provided
for by counsel at the inception of the corporation.
Since much has been written about the various types of stockholder
agreements,14 we will present only an outline of the types, and show how
they may be used in solving the deadlocked-board problem.
A.
Voting Trusts.
Many of the states have specific statutory provisions permitting voting
trusts. 15 Probably because the attorney can rely on this statutory recog-
nition, the voting trust is seeing more frequent use today than the pooling
agreement which does not have statutory approbation, and which will be
discussed subsequently. If there are no statutory provisions in the particular
state, the trust agreement must satisfy the common law of contracts and
trusts. 16 "The trust transfers to and vests in the trustee the stock and the
legal title to it, and the stockholders receive voting trust certificates in lieu
of their holdings so transferred." 17 The general rule is that the purpose
of the trust agreement determines its validity.18
For our purposes we will suppose a corporation of four stockholders
with the parties demanding a four-man board of directors. When a solu-
tion is sought by means of a voting trust, the by-laws should provide that
14. E.g., Ballantine, Voting Trusts, Their Abuses And Regulation, 21 TEXAS
L. REV. 139 (1942-43) ; Delaney, The Corporate Director: Can His Hands Be Tied
In Advance, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 52 (1950) ; Hornstein, Stockholders Agreements In
The Closely Held Corporation, 59 YALE L.J. 1040 (1949-50) ; Wormser, The Legality
of Corporate Voting Trusts and Pooling Agreements, 18 COLUM. L. REv. 123 (1918).
15. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §218 (Supp. 1956); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:10-10
(Supp. 1956); N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAw §50; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §2852-511
(Supp. 1956).
16. 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2077 (1952).
17. 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2075 (1952).
18. Ballantine, Voting Trusts, Their Abuses And Regulation, 21 TEXAS L. REV.
139, 142 (1942-43) ; 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2081 (1952) ; See 3
VILL. L. REV. 105 (1957).
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the board will be composed of not less than four nor more than five directors,
and that in the case of a deadlock, the board of directors shall call a stock-
holders' meeting at which a fifth director will be elected. It would be wise
also to provide in the by-laws that the voting at the meeting will be gov-
erned by the voting trust agreement. The voting trust agreement should
contain provisions that the shares shall be so voted by the trustees that the
four beneficiary stockholders will be elected directors. It should also
provide that, if a shareholders' meeting is called because of a deadlock, a
fifth director will be elected, and the stock will be so voted as to elect
Mister X as the fifth director. Of course, the Mister X elected will be one
in whom, considering the nature of the proposed corporation's purposes,
the prospective shareholders have confidence. Thus, in case the four-
man board comes to loggerheads over a problem, a fifth director will come
into the picture, the vote will go three to two, and a solution will be
achieved.
In De Marco v. Paramount Ice Corp.,19 a New York court held valid
a provision of a voting trust agreement which required that the trustees
vote so as to elect themselves directors, the court stating that a provision in
a stockholders' agreement that they will continue to vote for themselves was
valid. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court by way of dictum has stated that,
"By the terms of a trust it may be provided that trustee [sic] shall vote as
directed by settlor [sic] or by a beneficiary or by a third person." 20 The
Delaware Superior Court has said that, "Apart from limitations imposed
by statute or public policy, parties to trust agreements are at liberty to
adopt any provisions either as to substantive or mechanics as they may
elect." 21 The suggested agreement would meet the New Jersey limita-
tions laid down in the early hostile-to-voting-trusts case of Warren v.
Pim,2  that "(a) . . . the holders of all of the shares of the corporation
shall have an equal privilege . . . of availing themselves of the trust
agreement . . . , and (b) that the object and aim of the trust shall be
the equal benefit of all the shares."
Any attack made on the agreement would probably be directed at the
provision that in case of a meeting called because of a deadlock, a fifth
director (Mister X) will be elected. The argument would be that such
an agreement is a palpable limitation on the directors' discretion and a
sterilizing of the board in favor of a solution to the problem by the stock-
holders. Also, it will be argued that Mister X is intended to function merely
as an arbitrator. Conceding some validity to the first argument, in the case
of a corporation such as the one proposed (with.complete identity of share-
holders and directors, and in which all the shareholders are members of the
19. 102 N.Y.S.2d 692, 701 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
20. Edson v. Norristown-Penn Trust Co., 359 Pa. 386, 390, 59 A.2d 82, 84(1948).
21. State ex rel. Crowder v. Sperry Corp., 41 Del. 84, 93, 15 A.2d 661, 664
(1940).
22. 66 N.J. Eq. 353, 420, 59 Atl. 773, 799 (1904).
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voting trust agreement), if the court views it in the same light as the New
York Court in Clark v. Dodge 2 viewed a similar corporation, then the first
argument would fall. In the Clark case the court said that since the parties
were the complete owners of the corporation there was no reason why the
exercise of the power and discretion of the directors should not have been
limited by a valid agreement among themselves provided the interests of the
public were not affected. Since, in the proposed solution, all decisions are
made on the directorate level and by parties in the office of director, there
does not seem to be even a minimal impingement on the requirement of
centralized management or of the public interest in this centralized manage-
ment. On analysis, the second argument also falls. Mister X is not an
arbitrator who will preempt the power of the board and make a decision
binding on the other four members of the board, but rather a director with
all a director's rights and obligations, who, after consulting with the other
directors, is to cast his vote as a director on one side or the other with
the result that any decision is the product of the vote of the board of
directors.
The shareholders may be reluctant to tie up their stock in a voting
trust for a number of years. If so, this objection might be obviated by the
issuance of a class of preferred stock with conditional voting rights.24 The
right to vote would vest on the contingency of a deadlock, and the stock
would be made subject to a voting trust for the election of the four share-
holders plus Mister X. The charter would provide that the holders of the
common stock shall possess exclusive voting power for the election of di-
rectors, and the holders of the preferred stock shall have no voting power;
provided however, that, if at any time the board of directors should become
deadlocked, then the holders of the preferred stock shall have the sole right
to vote for the election of directors to the exclusion of any such right on
the part of the holders of the common stock. It would be provided also
that this right is to continue for one term or, should the deadlock continue,
until the deadlock is solved.25 Such right to vote has usually been condi-
tioned on the non-payment of dividends, but no reason is seen why a vest-
ing upon the happening of the proposed condition would not be valid.
B.
Pooling Agreements.
A pooling agreement is a contractual combination among the share-
holders to vote stock for certain purposes.
"It is not against public policy or unlawful per se for stockholders to
agree or combine for the election of directors or other officers, so as to
23. 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
24. 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2026 (1952); Illinois has a consti-
tutional prohibition on non-voting stock. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 3; People ex rel.
Watseka Tel. Co. v. Emmerson, 302 Ill. 300, 134 N.E. 707 (1922).
25. See Ellingwood v. Wolf's Head Oil Refining Co., 27 Del. Ch. 356. 38 A.2d
743 (1944).
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secure or retain control of the corporation, at least where the object
is to carry out a particular policy with the view to promote the best
interests of all the stockholders, and the agreement is fair to all the
stockholders alike, and to the corporation." 26
When the pooling agreement is used, the basic steps should be the
same as those used in the voting trust. The by-laws should provide that
the board will be composed of not less than four nor more than five men,
and, in the case of a deadlock, the board of directors shall call a stockholders'
meeting at which a fifth director will be elected, and that the voting at the
meeting will be governed by the pooling agreement. The pooling agree-
ment should provide that the shares shall be so voted that the four con-
tracting shareholders will be elected directors and that if a shareholders'
meeting is called because of a deadlock, a fifth director, Mister X, will be
elected.
In Clark v. Dodge 27 the New York Court was faced with a pooling
agreement in which the defendant agreed to vote his stock so that the
plaintiff would continue as a director. The Court said, "If the enforcement
of a particular contract damages nobody-not even, in any perceptible
degree, the public-one sees no reason for holding it illegal, even though
it impinges slightly upon the broad provisions of [the statute]." 28 In
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling,29 the pool-
ing agreement provided that if the parties could not resolve upon a par-
ticular party to be voted for as director, they would vote as directed by an
arbitrator. One party voted other than as the arbitrator directed, and the
Delaware court said that although the contract did not transfer the right
to vote to the arbitrator, a vote cast in derogation of the agreement and his
decision would not be counted. Although there is some doubt as to whether
other jurisdictions would go so far in the remedy,30 if the Delaware court
would allow the personnel of the board to be controlled by an agreement
in which the shareholder's right to vote and have his vote counted is nullified
by an arbitrator's decision, surely they would uphold an agreement of
stockholders in which the votes are to be cast as proposed. A Pennsylvania
Common Pleas Court in Baran v. Baran,3 1 said that since the parties could
have voted for and elected each other to the offices, they could bind them-
selves to such action by contract. The language of this case seems to
indicate that the court would not be adverse to the proposed agreement.
26. 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2064 (1952).
27. 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
28. Id. at 415, 199 N.E. at 642.
29. 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (1947).
30. Save for some minor exceptions, none of which the Ringling Bros. case comes
under, New York and Pennsylvania seem to limit challenging a shareholders right
to vote to his not being a shareholder of record. N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 47; PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-504 (Supp. 1956).
31. 59 D. & C. 556 (C.P. Luzerne 1947).
[VOL. 3: p. 196
23
Editors: Comments
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1958
JANUARY 1958]
III.
REMEDIES.
A.
Voting Trusts.
Since the deadlock-board problem presents itself in a time of dis-
harmony, there must be some thought given to the specific enforceability
of the agreement used. As between the parties to a voting trust agreement
they have available the general remedies and procedure of contracts and
trusts.3 2 The trustee may be enjoined from voting in violation of the
conditions of the trust.33 In Bryson v. Bryson8 4 the California Court said
that the trustee is bound to comply with the restrictions contained within
the trust instrument creating the trust, and an election at which votes cast
by a trustee in contravention of these restrictions was null and void.
B.
Pooling Agreements.
When a stockholders' pooling agreement is breached, the injured party
is entitled to have it judicially enforced by way of an injunction or the
granting of specific performance. In Harris v. Magrill 5 the three sole
stockholders in a close corporation entered a pooling agreement to vote their
shares so as to continue electing the parties to the agreement to the office
of director. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to enjoin the defend-
ants from ousting him as director. In Baran v. Baran 36 the plaintiff and
his two brothers owned ninety-five per cent of the stock of a Pennsylvania
corporation, and entered into an agreement to vote for each other as
directors and officers. When one brother sought to vote other than as
agreed, the court said such a contract was not against public policy or the
law, and the court decreed specific performance of the agreement.37 As
stated above, the Delaware court in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Corn-
bined Shows v. Ringling 38 ruled that a vote cast contrary to the agreement-
appointed arbitrator's direction would not be counted. Although it may be
that this form of remedy would not be granted elsewhere, it could possibly
result in a solution to the deadlock. In the Ringling Bros. case the cor-
poration was composed of three stockholders; two of whom entered the
agreement in question. When the votes of the party who did not vote
as the. arbitrator directed were not counted, the result was that control was
32. 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2095 (1952).
33. Byington v. Piazza, 131 App. Div. 895, 115 N.Y. Supp. 918 (1st Dep't 1909).
34. 62 Cal. App. 170, 216 Pac. 391 (1923)..
35. 131 Misc. 380, 226 N.Y. Supp. 621 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
36. 59 D. & C. 556 (C.P. Luzerne 1947).
37. See also Katcher v. Ohsman, 26 N.J. Super. 28, 97 A.2d 180 (1952).
38. 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (1947).
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vested in the third party. By not giving effect to votes cast contrary to an
agreement, this could result, in a four-man corporation, in having the elec-
tion (and the dispute) decided by two or three of the voting stockholders
and consequently an end to the deadlock. It is submitted that this would be
a rather haphazard solution and one of the aforementioned methods is
preferable.
IV.
CONCLUSION.
With the increased number of small corporations which have emerged
since the war years, the problem of the deadlocked board has come more
to the fore. The ideal solution to the problem would be a statutory recogni-
tion of the incorporated partnership and its peculiar problems of manage-
ment. However, until there is such a recognition, the task of the incor-
porating attorney is going to be to anticipate the problem of deadlock and
to provide for a solution by indirection.
Paul W. Callahan.
TAX ACCOUNTING-PROPERTY TRANSFER-
TIME OF REPORTING TAXABLE INCOME.
The income tax sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 impose
a tax on taxable income 1 which is defined as gross income minus permissible
deductions. 2 Generally speaking, the tax imposed is upon gross income
minus the cost of its acquisition.
The Code defines gross income in the following language: "Except as
otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from
whatever source derived. . .. " - The Regulations under the 1939 Code's
corresponding section 4 adopted the language of the Court in Eisner v.
Macomber: 5 "In general, income is the gain derived from capital, from
labor, or from both combined, provided it be understood to include profit
gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets. . ." 6 This being
so, a property transfer transaction resulting in gain will give rise to taxable
income, whether or not the property transferred is a capital asset.
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1.
2. Id. § 63.
3. Id. § 61.
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 23a, 53 Stat. 9.
5. 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920).
6. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.22(a)-1 (1953). All regulations cited throughout
this Comment are those currently in force, either under the 1954 Code or under the
1939 Code by virtue of T.D. 6091, 1954-2 Cum. BULL. 47, which continues, until
new ones are adopted, the 1939 Code Regulations not in conflict with the new Code.
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At this point, it would be worthwhile to outline the various forms of
property transfers, and since the most common form of such transfers is a
sale, the transferor will be referred to as Seller, the transferee as Buyer.
It appears that there are only four types of such transfers : 7
1.) Seller transfers the property now; Buyer gives the consideration
now.
2.) Seller transfers the property now; Buyer promises to give con-
sideration, and:
a) gives nothing now; or
b) gives a part of the consideration now, the rest to be given later,
either all at once or in installments; or
c) gives a security interest in either the property transferred or
in some other property now, with the consideration to be paid
all at once later, or in part now and the balance subsequently
all at once, or in installments.
3.) Seller gives a promise naked or secured, to transfer the property;
Buyer gives the consideration now.
4.) Seller gives a promise, naked or secured, to transfer the property;
Buyer promises to give consideration and:
a) gives nothing now; or
b) gives a part of the consideration now, the rest to be given later,
either all at once or in installments; or
c) gives a security interest in some other property now, with the
consideration to be paid all at once later, or in part now and
the balance subsequently all 'at once or in installments.
This Comment will be directed specifically to the tax position of Seller
in the credit sales described in 2.) above (although most, if not all, of what
is said will be equally applicable to Seller in the executory transactions
described in 4.) above). We will not consider transfers of peculiar prop-
erty specifically treated under a particular Code section.
I.
WHY THE TIME OF REPORTING MAY BE SIGNIFICANT.
Clearly, any taxable income realized from a property transfer must
be reported and a tax paid thereon at some time. But the determination
of the proper time to report it may very well be materially significant to
Seller. The income tax is an annual tax imposed upon the taxable income
7. Gifts are not included. This Comment is directed only to sales of property,
but includes sales wherein something other than money is given by the Buyer as
the present consideration for the property Seller transfers to him.
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of a particular taxable year.8 Hence there are a variety of situations in
which Seller would prefer to be taxed in this year rather than that year. To
illustrate: a) the rate of tax may differ from year to year, so that if Seller
may be taxed in this year, he will be taxed at a lower rate, and consequently
pay a smaller sum than if he had to be taxed in that year; b) Seller's other
income may be less in this year than his other income in that year, so that,
since the rate of tax is progressive,9 Seller would pay a smaller tax if he
could pay the tax from the transfer in this year; c) the statute of limita-
tions 10 may have run on this year so that if Seller can successfully assert
that the tax was due in this year, he will not have to pay any tax at all."
There exist, therefore, a variety of situations in which Seller will
desire to pay the tax on the property transfer in a particular year. This
poses the question which we shall consider: under the Code and the Regu-
lations, in what taxable year may/must Seller report the taxable income
and pay the tax resulting therefrom, if any?
II.
PERMISSABLE METHODS OF ACCOUNTING UNDER THE 1954 CODE.
Section 446 of the Code directs the taxpayer to compute his taxable
income by using the same method of accounting he regularly employs to
compute his income for his own bookkeeping purposes, so long as the
method he so uses clearly reflects his income. Subject to that qualification,
he may use any of the following methods of computation:
1. Cash receipts method;
2. An accrual method;
3. Any other method specifically authorized by the Code, such as the
installment sales method;
4. Any combination of these three methods permitted by the Regu-
lations.' 2
A taxpayer engaged in more than one trade or business may use a different
method to compute his income for each business; hence, if Seller in the
situation presented in 2.) above has a business other than selling property,
he may elect, to treat the transfer of property by a method other than that
which he uses for his regular. business.'8  Generally, unless otherwise
8. A taxable year may be a calendar year, a fiscal year, that period for which
a return is made if it is made for less than 12 months, or a 52-53 week year, if the
taxpayer so elects. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 441.
9. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1.
10. Generally speaking, the Commissioner has three years from the time of
filing of a return to start proceedings for the assessment and collection of tax; but
if the taxpayer omits more than 25% of his gross income on his return, the Com-
missioner has six years; and if the taxpayer is guilty of fraud, or of not filing a
return at all, the Commissioner is never barred. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6501.
11. See Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1948).
12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 446c.
13. Id. § 446d.
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authorized by a particular section of the Code, a taxpayer may not change
his method of accounting unless he obtains the consent of the Commis-
sioner.
14
There are three accounting methods which appear to be pertinent to
Seller in the given situation, viz., the cash receipts method, the accrual
method and the installment sales method. Included under the first two
methods mentioned is the deferred payment plan which is not technically
an independent accounting method since it is not authorized by section
446.1' Each of these methods will be discussed below and an attempt
made to point out the advantages and disadvantages of each.
III.
SELLER USES THE CASH RECEIPTS METHOD.
A Seller on the cash receipts method must account for his taxable
income in the taxable year in which he receives it, either actually or con-
structively. "Generally, under the cash receipts and disbursement method
. . . , all items which constitute gross income . . . are to be included
in the taxable year in which actually or constructively received." 16
With reference to the situation outlined in 2.) above:
1. Under a), Seller has received only a contract right in the
taxable year of the transaction. This receipt has no taxable significance
to him at this time.'
7
2. Under b), Seller has received some income in the taxable year
of the transaction; but he does not receive taxable income until he has
recovered his basis in the property transferred. 18
14. Id. § 446e.
15. Id. §446.
16. U.S. Treas. Reg. 1.446-1 (c) (1), as proposed December 21, 1956; under the
1939 Code, U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.42-1 (1953). Constructive receipt is defined
in a subsequent regulation as follows:
"Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer's possession is constructively
received by him in the taxable year during which it is credited to his account or
set apart for him so that he may draw upon it at any time. However, income is
not constructively received if the taxpayer's control of its receipt is subject to
substantial limitations or restrictions." U.S. Treas. Reg. 1.451-2(a), as pro-
posed December 21, 1956; under the 1939 Code, U.S. Treas. Reg. 118 §§ 39.42-2,
39.42-3 (1953).
17. "[W]hen the contract merely requires future payments and no notes, mort-
gages or other evidence of indebtedness such as commonly change hands in com-
merce, which could be recognized as the equivalent of cash to some extent are given
and accepted as part of the purchase price . . . [there is] no tax significance to
. . . seller if he is using the cash system." Harold W. Johnston, 14 T.C. 560
(1950).
18. The contractual obligation to pay the balance of the consideration in deferred
payments over a period of years is not the equivalent of cash and hence is not con-
structively received income. Curtis R. Andrews, 23 T.C. 1026 (1955) ; Nina J.
Ennis, 17 T.C. 465 (1951); Harold W. Johnston, 14 T.C. 560 (1950).
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3. Under c), let us suppose the following concrete example: Seller
inherits a parcel of land upon which stands what was once a useful
factory but is now only an empty building. Due to the locale and the
peculiar construction of this factory, Seller finds it very difficult to
either sell or lease it. Buyer then enters the picture; he does not have
much money, but he believes that he has a product which can be manu-
factured profitably on Seller's property. However, since he is not
altogether sure of success, he is hesitant to commit himself. Since
Seller has until now been unable to put the property to any productive
use, he agrees to Buyer's proposal, to wit: Buyer will purchase the
property for x dollars, to be paid over a period of years, and will
mortgage the property to Seller but not bind himself personally so that
if his plans do not materialize, he will be able to merely drop the matter
by permitting Seller to repossess the property and to keep whatever
payments Buyer may have made.
What, if anything, does a cash-basis Seller report in the taxable year
of this transaction? There does not appear to be a case squarely in point.' 9
Doubtless the first step to be taken is to determine the nature of the trans-
action. The parties have called it a sale, but it is clear that this is not neces-
sarily determinative. 20
"However, the test to determine whether an instrument which the
parties had called a lease was such or was a contract of sale should not
be what the parties call the transaction nor even what they mistakenly
believe to be the name of such transaction. What the parties believe
the legal effect of such a transaction to be should be the criterion..
We must look therefore to the intent of the parties in terms of what
they intended to happen." 2
Here, we have either a lease or a sale. It is suggested that every transaction
of the type outlined above must stand on its own facts. If the facts are such
that it tends to be unreasonable to suppose that Seller ever expected full
payment, but rather expected Buyer to default, it will be a lease. But if the
facts are such that it is at least as reasonable for Seller to expect that the
full price will be paid, it will be a sale.
Proceeding on the supposition that the transaction here was a sale,
Seller must pay a tax on the recognized gain therefrom. 22 The gain 2 is
19. There are cases involving somewhat similar factual settings in each of which
the issue involved presupposes that the transaction was a sale. But each can be
factually distinguished to a greater or lesser extent from the given situation. E.g.,
Hessler Machine Works, Inc., 39 B.T.A. 644 (1939) ; Joseph Frost, 37 B.T.A. 190
(1938); Woodmar Realty Co., 17 B.T.A. 88 (1929); Henry Heldt, 16 B.T.A.
1035 (1929).
20. Oesterreich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Benton v. Com-
missioner, 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Judson Mills, 11 T.C. 25 (1948).
21. Oesterreich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 798, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1955).
22. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1001, 1002.
23. Id. § 1001(a).
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the excess of the amount realized over the adjusted basis, and the amount
realized 24 is the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of
the property (other than money) received. In the taxable year of this
transaction, Seller has realized only whatever cash Buyer paid, since the
mortgage here is not the equivalent of cash in that it has no fair market
value.25
If Buyer had assumed personal liability and given a bond or a nego-
tiable note, Seller would have realized in the year of the transaction what-
ever cash Buyer paid plus the fair market value of the bond or note.
Of course, the fair market value of the bond or note would be at least the
value of the land. If Buyer were an individual, any further value would
depend on his solvency. If Buyer were solvent, presumably the note or
bond would have a fair market value equivalent to its face value. But
if Buyer were insolvent, or close to it, the fair market value would be
something less than the note's or the bond's face value.
If Buyer were a worthless corporation, the fair market value of the
bond or note would only equal the value of the property since the property
would be such a corporation's only asset. So too if Buyer were merely a
straw man-unless it could be shown that the real Buyer was solvent and
willing to pay so as not to lose the property.
Assuming that Seller either can not or does not want to change to the
installment method 26 to report this transaction, he must use the deferred
payment plan. This plan will be discussed in detail below; it is enough
to say here, that under this plan, Seller waits until he has recovered his
basis in the property, then reports all subsequent amounts received as gain.
If the security interest which Buyer gave to Seller was in a property
other than the one transferred and was intended merely as evidence of the
debt,27 or, having no fair market value, was not capable of conversion into
payment, Seller need consider only whatever payments Buyer made in the
taxable year of the transaction in reporting his income for that year. Since
Seller may regain his basis in the property transferred before he begins to
realize taxable income, the ordinary sale on deferred payments does not give
rise to taxable income in the taxable year of the sale.
IV.
SELLER USES THE ACCRUAL METHOD.
A seller using the accrual method must account for an income item
when he acquires a right to that income although it will actually be paid to
24. Id. § 1001 (b).
25. While a mortgage may have a fair market value, Nina J. Ennis, 17 T.C. 465
(1951), Harold W. Johnston, 14 T.C. 560 (1950), it need not, Henry Heldt, 16
•B.T.A. 1036 (1929), and in this example it would not.
26. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 453.
27. Schlemmer v. United States, 94 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1938) ; A. Hovey-King, 9
C;C.H. Tax Ct. Mem. 297 (1950).
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him at some future time.28 The proposed Regulations prescribe that "in-
come is to be included for the taxable year when all the events have occurred
which fix the right to receive such income and the amount thereof can be
determined with reasonable accuracy." 29 Thus with reference to the situa-
tion outlined in 2.) above: Under a) and b) Seller has acquired a right to
receive income and so must report his taxable income therefrom and pay
the tax due, if the amount to be received can be determined with reasonable
accuracy.a0 Under c) : assuming the factory example posed above is de-
termined to be a sale, Seller has reportable taxable income only if the
amount he will actually receive is determinable now with reasonable ac-
curacy. The question arises: can it be that Seller will be unable to make
such a determination and yet be permitted to characterize the transaction
as a sale? It is suggested that it is possible for Buyer and Seller to rea-
sonably intend a sale, and thus -it would be a sale, and yet that there be
sufficient doubt in Seller's mind concerning Buyer's eventual full payment
to justify the use of the deferred payment plan rather than the accruing
now of those payments.At
If the security interest which Buyer gave to Seller was in property
other than the one transferred, there should be no reasonable doubt, in the
ordinary case, of the eventual receipt by Seller of at least that amount of
the consideration Buyer contracted to pay which is equal to the fair
market value of the property transferred by Buyer as security.3
2
V.
SELLER USES THE INSTALLMENT METHOD (SECTION 453).
Under both the cash receipts method and the accrual method, Seller
may have to pay a tax upon the entire taxable income realized from the
transfer in one taxable year. Recognizing this, Congress provided in an
early revenue act .a an installment sales provision (section 453 of the 1954
Code) which in effect permits a "pay as you go" tax plan. Under this
section, Seller ". . . may return as income therefrom in any taxable
year that proportion of the installment payments actually received in that
year which the total or gross profit (that is, sales less cost of goods sold)
realized or to be realized when the property is paid for, bears to the total
contract price." 34 If Seller in 2) above is a "person who regularly sells
28. Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182 (1934).
29. U.S. Treas. Reg. 1.446-1(c) (2), as proposed December 21, 1956. There are
no precisely comparable regulations under the 1939 Code. Cf. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118,
§§ 39.41-1-39.42-3 (1953).
30. Harold W. Johnston, 14 T.C. 560 (1950).
31. "A taxpayer cannot be charged to have realized an income unless there
exists reason for believing that the income is likely to be paid or can be collected."
Corn Exchange Bank v. United States, 37 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1930).
32. Clifton Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 290 (4th Cir. 1943).
33. Revenue Act of 1926, §212(d), 44 Stat. 9, appears to be the first act contain-
ing such a provision.
34. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.44-1(4)(b) (1953). This language is almost iden-
tical to subsection (a) of the 1954 Code's corresponding section: INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 453(a).
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or otherwise disposes of personal property on the installment plan," " there
are no qualifications to this method. But, if Seller is not so regularly
engaged, i.e., if this were a casual sale of personal property, or any sale
of real property, then: the total price must exceed $1,000 and the pay-
ments, if any, in the taxable year of the sale must not exceed 30% of the
selling price.8 6 This method is optional with Seller in a), b), and c) above.
Neither the fact that Seller has been given a security interest, nor the
particular kind of such security interest affects Seller's option.3 7 If Buyer
should breach his contract sometime during its term and refuses to make
further payments, Seller may take a bad debt deduction, if a bad debt
actually exists, or if Seller had retained a security interest, he must adjust
the basis therein and report the resulting gain or loss.38
VI.
No FAIR MARKET VALUE-DEFERRED PAYMENT PLAN.
If Seller in 2) above uses the cash receipts method and if what he has
received from Buyer in the taxable year of the transaction is the equivalent
of cash and has an ascertainable fair market value, Seller has received
income for which he must account in that taxable year.39 If Seller is on
the accrual method, he may be faced with the problem of "determining with
reasonable accuracy" 40 the amount of the income to which he has now
acquired the right to realize at some future time. Seller can not make
such a determination if it is doubtful whether he will be paid when the
consideration is due.4 1 "The amount realized from the sale or other dis-
position of property shall be the sum of money received plus the fair market
value of the property (other than money) received." 42 "The fair market
value of property is a question of fact, but only in rare and extraordinary
cases will property be considered to have no market value." 43 The fair
market value of property is the price a buyer who is under no compulsion
to buy would offer and a seller who is under no compulsion to sell would
accept 4 Hence, the usual property transaction yields taxable income to
Seller in the taxable year of the transaction.
35. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §453(a).
36. Id. § 453(b) (2).
37. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.44-1 (1953).
38. Ibid.
39. Cherokee Motor Coach Co. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 840 (6th Cir. 1943).
40. See note 31 supra.
41. Clifton Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 290 (4th Cir. 1943) ; H. Liebs &
Co. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1937).
42. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1001.
43. U.S. Treas. Reg. 1.1001-1 (a), as proposed January 3, 1957. The corresponding
1939 Code regulation is U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.111-1(a) (1953).
44. 1919: T.B.R. 57, 1 CuM. BULL. 40; Bedell v. Commissioner, 30 F.2d 622
(2d Cir. 1929).
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On the other hand, it is possible that Seller will acquire in exchange
for his property something which has no fair market value. Perhaps the
most common class of cases exemplifying this situation is that in which
the payment to Seller by Buyer is contingent. In such a case, the
deferred payment accounting plan is utilized.45  Seller waits until Buyer
has paid Seller an amount equal to Seller's basis in the property and
reports all subsequent amounts received as gain.46 Statutory authority for
this plan is found in sections 1001 and 1002 of the Code: unless the amount
realized from the transfer exceeds Seller's basis in the property transferred
to Buyer, there will be no recognizable gain, and if what Buyer gives to
Seller in the taxable year of the transaction has no fair market value, there
is no amount realized. 47 The leading case in this field is Burnet v. Logan.48
Simplifying the facts of that case somewhat: The taxpayer sold shares of
stock in a corporation which owned a lease permitting it to take what
ore it wished from a mine. She received as consideration for the shares
a down payment and right to a subsequent payment per ton of ore later
mined. Since the mine lease did not specify the amount of ore to be mined
in any taxable year, and hence the total consideration she would eventually
receive was then unknown, taxpayer asserted the right to recover her basis
in the shares she sold before beginning to report amounts received as tax-
able income. Her contention was upheld. In the course of its opinion, the
Supreme Court said: "The promise [to pay taxpayer x cents per ton, of
ore mined] was in no proper sense equivalent to cash. It had no ascertain-
able fair market value. The transaction was not a closed one." 49
The Burnet opinion speaks in terms of "fair market value" and also
in terms of a "closed transaction." This appears to be a confusion of terms,
since a closed transaction is one in which each party to the transaction has
acquired an unqualified right that the other party perform although the
actual performance may be deferred.,50 But in Burnet, the taxpayer had no
right that Buyer should mine any ore at all, and hence no right to continued
payments.
It is not readily apparent what the concept embodied in the term
"closed transaction" adds to tax law, since it would appear that no tax
question could arise until the transaction had at least proceeded to the stage
wherein Seller acquired a clear right to a consideration from the Buyer.
The income tax is levied upon income realized, and while this includes
accruable income and income constructively received, it does not include
45. See Desmond, Sales of Property Under the Deferred-Payment Method, 32
TAXEs 40 (1954).
46. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931). See also Sabel, Additional Capital
Gain Opportunities-Open Transactions, 14 U. PiTT. L. REV. 30 (1952).
47. Cf. 1927: G.C.M. 1387, VI-1 Cum. BuLL. 48; C. W. Titus, Inc., 33 B.T.A.
928 (1936), nonacq. 1936: XV-1 Cum. BuLL. 46; Desmond, Sales of Property Under
the Deferred-Payment Method, 32 TAXEs 40 (1954).
48. 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
49. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 413 (1931).
50. Commissioner v. Union Pac. R.R., 86 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1936).
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income the right to which Seller only reasonably expects to acquire at
some future date. And, in a case where Seller has acquired a clear right
to a consideration from Buyer, the only material question would seem to be
whether this right to a consideration has a fair market value to a cash-
basis Seller, or whether the value of the right is reasonably determinable
to an accrual-method Seller.5 ' Unless the consideration has such a value,
no taxable income results. In the usual case in which it is found that the
transaction is not closed, the situation presented concerns either a contingent
right to a sum certain 52 or a certain right to a contingent sum. 3 In such
a case, Seller does not realize taxable income, not because the transaction
is not closed, but because Seller's right to the consideration can not be
fairly valued until either he actually receives it or the contingency dis-
appears.5 4
Suppose Seller uses this plan, and sometime before he has recovered
his basis, Buyer defaults and Seller repossesses the property. In this
transaction Seller parted with title; hence: the fair market value of the
property when repossessed is considered to be in payment of Buyer's
unpaid obligation. If the fair market value exceeds the value of Buyer's
obligation, Seller must report the excess as ordinary gain; if it is less than
Buyer's obligation, Seller may collect it as a bad debt if uncollectible. 5
If Seller had retained title (the transaction classified as 4)c)), then the
difference between the payments received from Buyer plus the fair market
value of any improvements he made to the property and the sum of the
profits previously returned as income plus an amount equal to what would
have been a proper depreciation deduction had Seller never entered the
transaction, must be reported as either gain or loss.56
VII.
CONCLUSION.
Seller in 2) above may report the taxable income he realizes, if any:
1.) If he is on the cash basis, in the year in which he realizes it either
actually or constructively, provided Buyer transfers property with
a fair market value;
51. "In [citing cases] the rights to receipt of future payment were subject to
a contingency which rendered their value unascertainable. In each, nothing remained
to be done by the company to earn the sums involved, but the amounts to be received
were contingent upon an act or acts to be performed by others.
It is this factor of unascertainable valuation which caused the courts to hold
the liquidation transactions open until the returns were received, thus allowing an
accurate monetary valuation to be affixed to the rights." George J. Lentz, 28 T.C.
No. 136 (Sept. 13, 1957).
52. Lucas v. North Texas Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 11 (1930).
53. U.S. v. Yerger, 55 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
54. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931); cf. Harold W. Johnston, 14 T.C.
560 (1950).
55. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.44(4) (1953).
56. Ibid.
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2.) If he is on the accrual basis, in the taxable year of the transaction,
unless he is then unable to determine the amount to be later real-
ized with a fair degree of accuracy;
3.) If he elects to use the installment method, a proportionate amount
in each of the taxable years in which he receives a payment; or
4.) If he must use the deferred payment plan, then in each of the
taxable years in which he receives payments after recovering his
basis.
In a specific case, any one of these methods may be desirable (for
example, the accrual method so as to take advantage of a heavy loss) but,
absent particular reasons, the installment method, with its pay as you go
aspect, would appear to be ordinarily desirable except where Seller is not
certain that he will realize that for which he has contracted. In the latter
case, the deferred payment plan will be preferred.
Joseph M. Smith.
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